
A labeler pastes the pull request title straight into a shell command, and the next contributor's title is a command substitution. Route every untrusted field through the environment instead. Graded on consequence: the payload must not execute, and the field must arrive byte for byte, which a workflow that records nothing cannot fake. The grader runs the same payload through a deliberately vulnerable workflow of its own, so an absent canary only counts once the payload has been shown to fire.
Two workflows run with a write-all token, reference every action by a movable tag, and hand the base repository's token to contributor code through pull_request_target. Narrow the token to the jobs that need it, pin every external action to the commit SHA the environment resolved at start, replace the pull_request_target checkout, and keep the signing key out of reach of pull request events. The pin check is paired with a run: act resolves a pin rather than merely parsing it, so an invented SHA fails outright and a removed step produces no artifact.
A pipeline about to go public pastes contributor text into a shell, runs every job with a write-all token, references actions by movable tags, hands the repository token to contributor code through pull_request_target, and lets a pull request reach the job that holds the signing key. Harden all of it. Graded on consequence across five runs: four malicious fields must arrive verbatim and inert, a benign contribution must still be labelled, only a push to main may sign, and the composition check reads whether the job that touched the stranger's text was itself able to sign, which one job doing everything cannot pass.